



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

TAKING IT TO THE NEXT LEVEL

Civilian-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies

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Introduction

Civilian-Military Collaboration in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

Complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) are human-made crises and natural disasters requiring an international response that extends beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and that includes a military element for purposes of civilian safety, relief security, or logistical expertise. Owing to the interdependence among members of the international community engaged in such emergencies, information sharing has been deemed necessary for achieving successful results. Information sharing can enhance operational efficiencies, thereby saving lives and resources, as well as laying the groundwork for rapid recovery and reconstruction. Military and intelligence agencies are unaccustomed to exchanging information with international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and vice versa. As a result, information sharing has been a frustratingly elusive requirement in responses to humanitarian crises.

Each CHE is different in some respects, but some aspects are similar across crises. One such commonality is the need to acquire, compile, analyze, disseminate, and use information before, during, and even after the emergency. No single approach can satisfy everyone's informational needs, yet there exists in every crisis a core of key information that has wide applicability for all those responding to the crisis. However, despite occasional information sharing, this practice has not been sufficiently institutionalized. Thus, collaboration between civilian and military entities cannot be counted on and is difficult to mobilize at the appropriate time.

Debunking as a Survival Tool" by H. Roy Williams, Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, U.S. Agency for International Development

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Special thanks to the workshop rapporteurs for their help in preparing this report:

Maj. Carey Blake, 353rd Civil Affairs Command; Molly Inman, National Defense University; SGM Eberhardt Lindner, 353rd Civil Affairs Command; and Suzanne Wopperer, United States Institute of Peace

Recent experiences illustrate that planned information sharing in peace support and humanitarian relief operations is an idea whose time has come. Not by chance nor accident have we arrived here, but by the vision and hard work of individuals and entities that have worked since Provide Comfort in northern Iraq to overcome the complexities posed by their interaction in CHEs. There are many recent examples of the military's commitment to information sharing: the U.S. Marine Corps' renowned Emerald Express, an annual symposium designed to bring together military and civilian organizations that may interact during complex emergencies; the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Program at Carlisle Barracks; the Partnership for Peace programs; and NATO's recent efforts to streamline operations that include civilian and military entities.

The above efforts are complemented by collaborative initiatives among humanitarian agencies. In Kosovo, for example, members of the United Nations (UN) and donor agencies established an informal Geographic Information Support Team, or GIST, testing the feasibility of utilizing geographic information systems in a collaborative manner in Kosovo. The Kosovo Humanitarian Community Information Center (HCIC), established by the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and located in Pristina, facilitates coordination among all entities involved in emergency relief and reconstruction in Kosovo. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) established a shared telecommunications infrastructure, Internet Project Kosovo (IPKO), for use by NGOs, IOs, and the military with the intention of eventual turnover to local civilians. Also, NGOs created their own council in order to share information and organize projects in Kosovo. Thanks to ReliefWeb, the premier Web site for CHEs, virtually everyone has access to valuable information from the field provided by the Kosovo HCIC. Finally, a Rapid Village Assessment Form was developed for Kosovo (and in a modified version, used in East Timor) to retrieve and share statistical information about vulnerable populations.

These informal yet effective information-sharing efforts raise a number of questions:

- How interdependent are entities in peace support and humanitarian operations? Is the interdependence sufficient for all or many entities to agree that some kind of information sharing is necessary?
- On the basis of what common principle or set of principles and in the context of what set of circumstances and conditions would information sharing be considered beneficial?
- Can levels of information sharing be defined? What information can be shared? What information cannot be shared? How should individual and institutional information privacy be handled, maintained, and

secured?

- What standards exist or need to be developed to collect, analyze, retrieve, and exchange information? How can information from multiple sources be validated? In short, how can data be deemed trustworthy?
- How can information sharing strengthen trust, transparency, and accountability among organizations?
- Can the concept of a lead agency be extended to information sharing? Is there a need to designate an information-sharing coordinator to promote collaboration among civilian and military entities? How would such an arrangement work, given other lines of authority and accountability?
- Ultimately, to what degree could information sharing be institutionalized? Would donors require that information-sharing arrangements be established and maintained prior to and during CHEs? Finally, who would provide the resources for such arrangements and why would those funders be willing to bear the costs?

Conference on Information Sharing in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

The United States Institute of Peace and the 353rd Civil Affairs (CA) Command organized a joint conference to discuss the obstacles and incentives to information sharing in the planning and implementation of peace support and humanitarian relief operations.

Since 1995 the United States Institute of Peace, through its Virtual Diplomacy Initiative, has been following the effects of the new information and communications technologies (ICTs) on the nature and conduct of international relations. Specifically, this initiative seeks to assist practitioners and scholars to identify and apply ICTs in preventing, managing, and resolving international conflict. From its inception, the initiative has explored how to use these new technologies to respond more effectively to humanitarian crises and international conflict. It has investigated the use of remote sensing and geographical information systems, the expansion of Internet access into the field of operations, and models of information sharing among governments, militaries, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations during CHEs.

For its part during the past decade, the 353rd CA Command has directly participated in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations and exercises in countries from Albania to Zimbabwe. Organized on July 14, 1952, the 353rd, a U.S. Army Reserve unit headquartered in New York City, is one of four CA commands in the U.S. Army. Based on its operational and training experiences, the 353rd CA Command recognizes the importance of including members of IOs and NGOs in its professional development activities to promote better

understanding of each other's cultures and capabilities. Through these contacts, civilian and military organizations can improve their cooperation in the field.

Military CA addresses the need of commanders to consider the entire environment in which military forces operate, especially the indigenous and international civilian populations within the area of a CHE. Another example of changing mandates and roles affected by the post-Cold War world and the Information Revolution, CA personnel have become substitute civil society advisers as well as liaisons between the military units and civilians during these emergencies. CA personnel's particular professional areas of expertise in civilian life, such as economics and commerce, public health, finance, communications and information, or language, prepares them to perform military-to-host-nation advisory activities, to provide parallel government functions for a nonfunctioning state, or to interface between the military and the humanitarian organizations during an operation. It was CA personnel who helped organize the first post-Dayton elections, both general and municipal in Bosnia. Members of the 353rd worked in OSCE for four rotations. They assisted in registering voters by writing the computer programming that produced the voter rolls, then printed, and distributed the rolls to the various voting centers, as well as serving as general desk officer support and operations officers in the elections operations center during the elections.

Like the United States Institute of Peace, the 353rd CA Command is uniquely positioned to offer a diplomatic service to military and humanitarian communities by helping them to sort through the complexities involved in sharing information, identifying ways to overcome major differences but also recognizing that while some differences cannot be overcome they may be accommodated.

Based on their common interest in enhancing the effectiveness of civilian-military relations during CHEs, the United States Institute of Peace and the 353rd CA Command agreed to co-sponsor a conference focusing on improving planning and operational coordination. The goal of the joint conference -- entitled "Taking It to the Next Level" and held in San Antonio, April 6-9, 2000 -- was to develop recommendations for the establishment of information sharing mechanisms in support of advanced planning and program implementation by international entities involved in CHEs.

Advanced Planning and Program Implementation Workshops

In order to address the complicated issue of cooperation in sharing information, conference organizers identified two overarching groups: those who strategize and formulate advanced plans for a response (typically at headquarters) and

those who implement the plans in the field. In smaller organizations, one person may handle both functions. Each group has a particular set of needs and objectives that are usually transmitted through their own intraorganizational communications systems. Often, however, strategists and implementers may need to consult with their counterparts in civilian or military, governmental or nongovernmental entities. For example, NGOs and IOs may need to know what kind of logistical capacity and equipment the military is bringing to the field; while the military may need to know which NGOs or IOs are distributing food to refugees and in which camps or who is allocating radio frequencies among the various organizations on the ground.

Understanding how the various organizations operate in the field is an important result of information sharing. Nonetheless, sharing information during the planning phase could lead to an equally or even more important outcome: appreciation of each other's goals and objectives, hence better cooperation as organizations prepare to deploy to the field. How individuals in these organizations communicate with people from other organizations and ultimately share information about both plans and implementing methods has yet to be established. The focus of the advanced planning and program implementation workshops was to construct that missing link at both the planning and implementation stages of a CHE.

Prior to the workshops, keynote speakers and panelists provided a common framework for discussing strategic planning and field operations.

Conference participants were divided into two groups depending on their experience and current organizational responsibilities. Three facilitators, representing the NGO, IO, and military perspectives, guided the discussions of the two groups. Facilitators used the following list of questions to frame the issues but were invited to substitute other questions as issues arose during the discussion:

1. What are the incentives for sharing information in support of advanced planning and operational implementation?
2. What are the disincentives for sharing information in support of advanced planning and operational implementation?
3. What resources are already in place or that should be utilized? Who should use them?
4. What roles and resources are required for an information-sharing regime to support advanced planning and operational coordination?
5. How can information-sharing regimes be institutionalized, and how can funding occur?
6. Is it possible to have a central information system that

can serve both the military and civilians and satisfy their needs?

7. If this were the year 2005 and a complex emergency were developing, what would an optimal information-sharing mechanism to link the entities, including the military, involved in planning and implementing the response be like (e.g., principles, guidelines, incentives, budget, data, technical capacity and support, organizational structures)?

After a day and a half of discussion, participants reconvened in plenary to report on their findings and recommendations about how to take civilian-military cooperation to the next level. This report is the result of their respective reports.

Discussions were on a "not-for-attribution" basis, which allowed for a frank give-and-take between the civilian and military personnel in each of the groups. Despite the fact that groups worked separately, each group's findings and recommendations were similar and overlapped in some areas, which were combined in this report. As we worked through the reports, we recognized that the issues, discussions, and recommendations reflected a "typical" chronology of how humanitarian and military responses unfold. A rubric arrived at by the advanced planning workshop expresses the differences: "Plan we must versus plan if we can." The military, well known for its extensive planning, had to face the reality that NGOs simply do not have advanced warning time to plan. From the implementation workshop, the rubric that captured the attitude, not to mention the reality, toward the practice of routine information sharing was "Not always; get over it."

Messages from Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace, and Brig. Gen. Sam E. Gibson, Commander, 353rd Civil Affairs Command

Dear Colleague:

The United States Institute of Peace is proud to have played a role in the April 2000 conference "Taking It to the Next Level: Civilian-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies." We are grateful to the 353rd Civil Affairs Command for having invited us to join them in an attempt to build mutual understanding and mechanisms for

cooperation between civilian humanitarian organizations and the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs personnel.

We have long sought to help the military and civilian sectors develop better communications systems and practices as they take on the challenges of complex humanitarian operations. Since our earliest conference on this issue, "Managing

Communications: Interventions in Africa," jointly sponsored with the National Defense University in 1996, each community has progressed in its effort to overcome information isolation in the field.

Nevertheless, there is still much work to be done. Reports from the conference offer a positive picture of a more realistic approach and concrete planning to advanced cooperation as each organization and community prepares for and conducts responses to CHEs. To be sure, many obstacles still face these groups as they respond to chaotic and dangerous situations. Yet, I am convinced that recognition of the groups, mutual desire to help the victims of these crises, as well as their mutual regard for each other's professionalism in doing so, ensures that information sharing will improve.

Those of you who attended this conference are to be congratulated for your principled approach, your willingness to put everything on the table, and your tenacity. This report illustrates not only how diligently you pursued your respective goals but how open-minded you were in considering new perspectives. Thank you for your hard work.

You have helped push the issue of civilian-military cooperation to a higher level.

Sincerely,

Richard H. Solomon

President, United States Institute of Peace

Dear Colleague:

Without question, the United States Institute of Peace and the 353rd Civil Affairs Command Joint Conference succeeded in "taking it to the next level."

Frankly, I believe that this conference of diverse relief and peace support groups and Army Civil Affairs would have been impossible ten, or even five, years ago. Since that time, however, we have had many occasions to work together, and those opportunities laid the groundwork for the highly productive discussions at this conference.

During a frank and candid exchange of views, we learned so much about each other. We realized we had assumed we understood each other's objectives and capabilities much better than we actually did. Myths and misconceptions were

debunked. We aired our ambivalence about cooperating. We identified both the limitations and the opportunities for cooperation, and we brainstormed ways to maximize the strengths each organization brings.

We left the conference with new knowledge, a collective understanding, and shared ideas offering great promise to improve our operations in the field. The next step in moving to the next level is to implement those ideas as policy,

creating the necessary mechanisms to enable the policies and enhance our effectiveness.

I congratulate conference participants on a truly worthwhile accomplishment, and I challenge us to press forward to realize the full value of the opportunities before us.

Sincerely,

Brig. Gen. Sam E. Gibson

Commander, 353rd Civil Affairs Command

Principles of Conduct

In a natural disaster, civilian and military goals are usually similar and uncomplicated. On the other hand, human-made disasters leading to complex emergencies often begin as an internal conflict, sometimes involving a failed state, which escalates to a humanitarian crisis, threatening the entire population as well as the security of neighboring states. At the point when external political powers, either through a UN mandate or regional agreements, intervene with a military force to stabilize the situation, the situation becomes significantly more complex, political, and precarious for international and local NGOs and IOs and for the civilian population.

Humanitarian organizations are the principal actors in a relief response during a crisis. Often they are the sole international responders. In general, humanitarian NGOs and IOs are guided by three principles as they respond to a humanitarian crisis: humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. These organizations and their members operate from the premise that human suffering should be relieved wherever it is found. In the course of providing relief, they attempt to show respect and protect the inherent dignity and other human rights of all individuals and groups, irrespective of their political side or role and without discrimination. Although the needs of all individuals and groups who are suffering -- without regard to nationality, political or

ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity -- are considered, needs assessments and relief activities give priority to the most urgent cases. The principle of neutrality dictates that humanitarian relief should be provided without bias toward or against one or more of the parties to the political, military, religious, ideological, or ethnic controversy that has given rise to the human-made crisis. Humanitarian actors therefore believe they must not allow themselves to become allied with, or be perceived as allied with, a party to a conflict. The degree of adherence to these principles naturally varies somewhat according to circumstances and the mandates of particular organizations.

During the past decade, military forces have been deployed in response to a number of humanitarian crises in order to ensure that the relief reaches vulnerable civilian populations or to carry out other "peace support operations." Within the military services, the CA commands, from a variety of American, British, Canadian, and other national services, have participated in humanitarian and peace support operations and exercises in many countries. In U.S. doctrine, military CA addresses the need of military commanders to consider the entire environment in which military forces operate, especially the indigenous populations, institutions, and authorities, and the wide range of international military and civilian entities and civilian populations within the area of a CHE.

CA entities are of particular significance in peace operations and humanitarian relief efforts because they serve as liaisons to and coordinate with multinational and indigenous security forces, local government agencies, IOs and NGOs, and representatives from civil society. CA members pursue professional vocations in their civilian life that prepare them to perform military-to-host-nation advisory activities; to provide parallel government functions for a nonfunctioning state or to work as liaisons between the military and the humanitarian organizations during an operation.

Although the military and international humanitarian organizations find themselves working side-by-side in these complex emergencies, they operate quite differently. As a consequence, they each tend to regard their activities and information as proprietary, believing their respective organizational integrity, and thus mission, are at stake should they appear to be "co-opted" by the military on the one hand, or subject to "mission creep" on the other. Collaboration -- even if only perceived -- with the military can spell danger for NGOs, bound by a mandate based on the principle of neutrality. Military participants, on the other hand, are concerned about operational security, particularly in the presence of hostile combatants.

Participants from both the CA and humanitarian organizations agreed that information in or from the field is often withheld or

"spun" to coincide with particular objectives. NGOs have been known to inflate data to dramatize the seriousness of the crisis and their work in order to attract donors. The military, frequently accused of acting unilaterally, is said to unnecessarily classify and withhold data because of operational security risks. (Recently these risks have been exacerbated by a domestic political requirement to protect its military forces from any harm.) Often NGO-derived information becomes classified simply because the military inserts it into a report.

Participants acknowledged the value of a policy of information exchange between the two communities at both the strategic planning and field implementation phases of an operation. The two communities still have much to learn about each other. For instance, in a discussion about each other's objectives, the CA participants heard that NGOs and IOs believed that the military wants to assume responsibility for humanitarian relief operations. With the increase in complex emergencies around the world, in the NGO and IO view, the military sees an opportunity to keep "gainfully employed" by conducting humanitarian interventions. Many NGO and IO participants were surprised to learn that on the contrary, the military are generally reluctant participants in humanitarian assistance missions.

CA participants added that because they continue to be assigned to military operations other than war, they need more and better focused training for these operations. This is particularly true for military units, which train to fight wars and not to support humanitarian operations. Both military and civilian participants supported the idea of having more opportunities to learn about each other and to develop communication mechanisms supporting consensual "information transparency."

Participants observed that such a policy of information transparency could benefit national policymakers as well. Because policymakers either do not know where to find information or are content with their own information resources, they routinely underutilize existing resources, ignore key players, and act on less than the best possible information.

Civilian participants noted a specific problem for their organizations: donor-focused responses and publicity. NGOs receive their funding from donors, who then direct or target specific NGO activities and objectives. This overly directive relationship can create problems for NGOs as they respond to unfolding events. They may feel pressured to deliver the results that a donor desires or risk funding cuts. For instance, an activity that a donor may wish to publicize widely may require a degree of sensitivity and confidentiality. Donor-designated funding does not always correspond well to actual events on the ground.

At the end of a humanitarian crisis, other entities arrive to

address recovery and reconstruction. Participants noted the chaos, and occasionally tragedy, that can ensue if no mechanisms, including early involvement of these organizations during planning, are in place to ensure a smooth transition between relief and recovery. They drew special attention to the need to acknowledge that their actions on the ground affect the political, social, and economic dynamics of the local communities. They saw a compelling need for all relief and recovery actors to recognize this effect and work to preempt it.

This is much easier said than done, meaning that good intentions can go awry in such politically charged operations. One participant volunteered a dramatic example from his experience in Somalia. It showed the tragic effects of not having created a mechanism for a civilian -- in this case a local civilian -- to remain or reclaim neutrality once the intervention was over. The U.S. military helped a doctor to build a medical complex to treat refugees, allowing her to care for a greater number of victims. When the military eventually pulled out, however, both the doctor's husband and son were murdered because of her presumed collusion with the U.S. military.

Recommendations

Operational organizations in CHEs should

- Avoid compromising civilian organizational integrity or neutrality by promoting and supporting better information transparency from everyone.
- Increase information exchange among and between civilian and military organizations in order to reduce operational security risks and avoid duplication of efforts.
- Have the U.S. government review classification criteria with an eye toward loosening them and quickly declassifying information useful for the civilian counterparts in the field.
- Educate donors about the risks of disregarding emerging local needs, conditions, and initiatives.
- Develop policy statements that define the mechanisms and tools by which civilian and military organizations can interact before, during and after CHEs.
- Heighten awareness about successes and failures in the transition from relief to reconstruction. Consider transition initiatives for reconstruction early in the crisis planning.

Plan We Must versus Plan If We Can

Both civilian and military organizations plan; however, just as they approach their missions differently, they also plan differently for a CHE. The terminology each uses reflects this difference. For instance, military leaders refer to military action in the area of responsibility (AOR) as an "operation"; civilians refer to their action in the field as a "response." For civilians, strategic or advanced planning is a necessary part of electing to deploy to a crisis and preparing for activities to run smoothly in the field. Typically, however, once on the ground, logistical planning is the most that civilian entities may have the resources for or need to do.

Not all conference participants agreed that CHEs are conducive to strategic advanced planning prior to arriving in the field. All agreed, however, that responding to CHEs demands planning flexibility. Situations on the ground inevitably outrun or derail elaborate plans developed at headquarters. Other participants observed, on the other hand, that adequate advanced planning offers an opportunity to prepare several contingency responses to conceived exigencies and thus provides some way to approach changing circumstances. Planning and training are core military activities. The military does detailed advanced planning as a function of its organizational culture and hierarchical structure. During CHEs, however, this commitment to advanced planning can hamstring contingency-response mechanisms.

The necessarily reactive nature of humanitarian responses makes advanced planning a luxury for most NGOs and IOs, which have limited resources and staffs that are stretched thin. As such, NGO headquarters staff members generally defer to ground coordinators for decisions about the necessary responses to changing circumstances. Indeed, for many NGOs, flexible, decentralized, and local contingency planning is more appropriate than advanced planning because of the range, type, and scope of issues that arise in emergency situations. Advanced planning may overlook possibilities, while solving exigencies requires creativity on the part of operators on the ground. Many NGO representatives pointed out that advanced planning is at best hypothetical and even then dependent upon eleventh-hour funding.

However, only advanced planning can identify the levels of investment attached to policy options and allow policymakers to make those commitments. Failure to make certain "investments" at an early stage will preclude various choices later on. For example, citizen registration or a census is a necessary prerequisite for elections. If decisions to register citizens are not made early enough, elections may be delayed.

Participants believed that acknowledging these different organizational approaches to planning is an important step in identifying each organization's core capacities. Such a

fundamental recognition will allow each community -- military and civilian -- to begin addressing how to resolve the tensions and complications that these differences can cause during the communities' interaction in the field.

Participants noted that good preparation should include more than just knowing about the host country and its people. There should be information about past and ongoing local and international activities; personnel, resources, and capacities already in place on the ground; as well as the condition of existing infrastructure, such as telephone lines or potable water sources. Participants further agreed that responsibility for knowing and sharing this information begins during predeployment planning and continues through mission implementation and into postconflict reconstruction. Gathering this information should be part of each organization's preparation, participants said.

Moreover, participants believed that military and civilian organizations should cross-train in anticipation of finding themselves together in the field. Appropriate opportunities and sponsoring agencies for cross-training are few. Consultative exchanges to explain organizational cultures and structures, missions, and policies would also make the organizations familiar with each other's cultures and ease differences in the field. Some NGOs, IOs, and military units are also exchanging liaisons, which they find helpful particularly during a crisis, when the liaison acts as an "interpreter." The mutual understanding afforded by these exchanges can help clarify objectives for each organization's implementers as they encounter activities in the field that may be unique to this particular mission.

Recommendations

Operational organizations in CHEs should

- Encourage familiarity with other organizations' cultures, methodologies, and missions through cross-training.
- Establish formal or informal training exchanges between and prior to deployments.
- Explore the possibility of having consultative exchanges or permanent liaisons between organizations.
- Make up-to-date information about each organization's activities, plans, and resources easily available before, during, and after the crisis.
- Provide more discretionary spending for the military in the field to offset the inconvenience and frustration of having less capacity to respond to unexpected conditions, a kind of "contingency capacity."

- Provide military units in the field with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software to support internetworking with the entire range of participants in CHEs.

In Touch: Not Always, Get Over It

Participants also identified an ongoing need for both humanitarian and military organizations to have access to accurate and comprehensive information about conditions and each other's activities in the field. Each organization typically collects and assesses a wide range of information about the same terrain and populations. Not all of it is posted in a central or easily accessible location. Minefield or unexploded ordinance locations, infrastructure damage, military or relief staff rotations, and other information is usually not made available. Unannounced and frequent military rotations, particularly in U.S. Security Force (SFOR), caused enormous vexation among NGOs. The lack of notice to the civilian sector about these rotations meant that there was little, if any, continuity in the cooperative relationships and joint projects.

Military involvement in a CHE is almost always related to security issues, about which humanitarian organizations are naturally concerned. Humanitarian organizations would find military information helpful as they conduct their activities. Likewise, information that the humanitarian community tends to have readily available -- for example, information about sanitation, water supply, linguistic resources and cultural patterns -- could help CA enhance its performance as liaison between the international community and the local civilians and military.

The lack of a central collection and distribution point or coordinator of information is painfully evident when several organizations ask for the same information from the same local civilians about their needs. Bad enough that these civilians are asked by multiple organizations for the same information, but they typically do not see a follow up response from those organizations, much less a coordinated attempt to meet their needs. Failure to share such information and to catalog the resulting assessments, or to update existing assessments, can easily cause communities to become suspicious about, frustrated by, and apathetic about the goals of the international participants.

An important element of information-sharing regimes is that organizations need to be able to use and retain specialized data and formatting that is unique to them while nonetheless providing usable data to their partners. Both common definitions

of "core" data elements and reporting formats that will allow inclusion of nonstandard data are required.

A less urgent but highly valuable use of shared field assessments and project reports is to provide all organizations a means by which to evaluate their respective and combined effectiveness. Among the military services, measuring effectiveness is a standard operating procedure. Several recent initiatives are attempting to establish operating standards to evaluate the humanitarian community's activities as well. In particular, the SPHERE project -- which includes a number of NGOs, IOs, and interested donor governments -- has established several sets of sectoral standards in water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning, and nutrition. Typically, donor organizations establish standards or measures of effectiveness that their NGO implementing partners must meet. The United Nations Sustainable Development Program has been working on internationally agreed-upon measures of development that can be applied to reconstruction and development activities in the latter phases of CHEs. Recent developments in NATO doctrine on peace support operations stress the need for the military to be aware (in its planning and operations) that the ultimate success of the international response to a CHE must be measured in terms that go well beyond strictly military objectives.

Among the problems with military and civilian organizations sharing information in a zone of violent conflict is how to validate the accuracy of the information, on the one hand, and ensure its security, on the other. Also, civilians do not want to appear to be sharing "intelligence" with the military. The military, for its part, worries that civilians are less rigorous about information integrity, neither protecting it nor ensuring its accuracy. These concerns continue to slow progress on developing a reliable, secure, accessible, and neutral means of sharing information.

Participants identified four critical general components for such an information-sharing structure. It should (1) promote familiarity with organizations active in a particular CHE; (2) offer unclassified and declassified assessments that are synthesized and formatted; (3) ensure information accuracy and security; and (4) establish ways to evaluate performance effectiveness. In past CHEs, a number of structures have been devised to respond to these needs. The following list shows the range of such efforts, from informal to formal, and limited to all-inclusive. Some efforts worked better than others, but all of them depended on often unpredictable variables. It is evident, however, that the need for information sharing, cooperation and coordination was the rationale for each.

- Lead agency: At the outset of an emergency, the office of the UN coordinator for the affected country assumes the role as the lead coordinating agency for the UN

humanitarian response. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in Geneva (which includes UNHCR; the European Community Humanitarian Office; U.S. Agency International Development, Bureau of Human Rights and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; and State Department, Population, Refugees, and Migration, and is chaired by OCHA) will designate another agency in those cases where the country coordinator does not have the capacity or resources to lead the response. OCHA acts as the interagency coordination and information exchange body among UN humanitarian agencies.

- Under the auspices of UN's OCHA, ReliefWeb (www.ReliefWeb.int) is the foremost Web site for humanitarian relief efforts worldwide. It organizes information from over 300 sources, including the UN, nongovernmental organizations, academic and research institutions, and the media, providing time-critical situation reports and press coverage, donor response information, maps, and other relevant documents by country, disaster type, and organizational source. ReliefWeb strives to meet the needs of relief staff members, journalists, researchers, donors and policymakers who are focused on CHEs.
- The International NGO Council is an association of international NGOs committed to supporting the recovery and peace processes in conflict zones and promoting information sharing, cooperation, and joint action.
- In Kosovo, the HCIC is located in the UNHCR building in Pristina. Its mission is to promote information sharing and facilitate coordination among organizations engaged in emergency relief and rehabilitation. It links to NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The HCIC staff collects, organizes, and disseminates information on humanitarian activities, resources, and organizations and also participates in sectoral working groups to facilitate humanitarian initiatives. The HCIC maintains a database of local and international organizations working in Kosovo, offers practical advice to the humanitarian community, and provides centralized bulletin boards and mailboxes for organizations. Conceptually, it is similar to the Humanitarian Operations Center that was first established in Somalia and the On-Site Operations Coordination Center in Rwanda. Civilian UN staff members representing the designated lead agency directed these two earlier coordination efforts.
- The establishment of a shared telecommunications infrastructure (IPKO) by IRC allowed the international community to have Internet connectivity early in the UNMIK. IPKO was designed to be administered by local civilians, and IPKO staff provided technical training and

eventually turned over this Internet service provider (ISP) to the civilians. IPKO is now the leading ISP in Kosovo, providing land-based and wireless Internet service to more than 80 organizations, including all the UN agencies, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and most international NGOs. IPKO sells service to international organizations and for-profit companies in order to subsidize free connections to key civil society entities like the university, hospital, local media, and indigenous NGOs.

- The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), the coordinating mechanism between the U.S. military and relief agencies during CHEs, has been incorporated into U.S. military doctrine since the establishment of the first CMOC during Operations Provide Comfort and Provide Relief in northern Iraq and Somalia, respectively. In recent history, the CMOC has proven to enable basic information sharing without risk of compromise. Participants with shared experiences pointed to successful CMOCs in Sarajevo, the Republika Srpska, and Central America during the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch.
- Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the NATO term for the planning and conduct of all interaction between the military and the civil sector during military operations. During Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, the multinational CIMIC staff received requests for military support from the UN, NGOs, and IOs and also provided briefings about military activities and security issues to these organizations.

Participants suggested that to overcome the ad hoc nature of attempts to share information, cooperate, and coordinate field activities, an information strategy should be adopted that would precede and accompany the UN's selection of a lead agency. Based on that strategy, the selected lead agency would then charter information-sharing mechanisms adapted to the particular response. Many participants pointed to the success of the HCIC in Kosovo as a good model for the permanent creation of such UN-based information and coordination mechanism.

Military participants thought the CIMIC arrangements in Kosovo, and the CMOC in other interventions, were also useful. What was missing, all participants noted, was an institutional link between these separate civilian and military information-sharing mechanisms.

Recommendations

Operational organizations in CHEs should

- Develop and adhere to a policy governing an information-sharing regime in the field.

- Agree to establish and comply with generic assessment language and standard data sets to prepare, share, and evaluate accurate and uniform assessments.
- Agree to establish and comply with common measures of performance to evaluate relief responses.
- Centrally locate all field assessments, so they can be reviewed, updated, and evaluated to minimize duplication of effort and to maximize effectiveness of all field actors. Putting data on a dedicated Web site or otherwise establishing a well-known and easily accessible information clearinghouse would serve a number of uses and users: (1) providing tools for planners and predeployment actors; (2) offering a ready, transparent, and centralized database for mission implementers; (3) reducing duplication of efforts in the field; and (4) accelerating postcrisis reconstruction.
- Strengthen ReliefWeb.
- Consider the Kosovo HCIC model for NGO/IO coordination effort in CHEs.
- Consider the IPKO model as a shared transferable Internet infrastructure.

Linking Efforts

Participants agreed that information sharing among organizations could strengthen performance in the field. Reluctance to share information, particularly between civilian and military entities, can increase when the situation on the ground is politically complicated by an intrastate or international conflict. Civilian-military relationships are relatively straightforward and uncomplicated during responses to natural disasters when relief goals are complementary; then, sharing information and coordinating activity are mutually beneficial. CHEs, however, are another story; these give rise to conditions that make cooperation between civilian and military entities problematic.

In a CHE, mission and operational differences have tended to foster distrust between civilian and military organizations. Each worries that the other will compromise sensitive information, which in turn could jeopardize success in the field and create misperceptions in the local population. The mere appearance of civilians working or sharing information with the military, however innocent, can lead to relief staff being denied access to vulnerable local populations, or worse, targeted by one or more of the warring parties. The survival and success of humanitarian organizations in the field are contingent upon their principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. On the other hand, the military force is often sent to protect and ensure that the humanitarian effort carries on. Force is rarely used to stop political violence. When it is, however, in order to conduct the

mission effectively, military units will use and need to maintain the security of "intelligence," which becomes classified, or "proprietary" information.

Participants from both types of organizations recognized that mutual distrust during CHEs is prudent, given the organizations' different missions and ways of operating. Nevertheless, a policy of noncommunication between them inhibits cooperation when collaborative and mutually beneficial opportunities for collaboration arise. Participants observed that just knowing how and what information can be exchanged before they come into contact in the field could help their organizations manage expectations as well as suspicions about each other's role during a crisis. Each needs to explain forthrightly to the other what information can be shared and what information cannot be shared. In politically sensitive environments, a policy of "tell me what you can't tell me" can go a long way to diffuse suspicion and define the limits of cooperation in the field.

Because IOs tend to have similar mandates during a crisis, especially within the context of the UN's lead agency process, an impartial authority as an information facilitator could quite easily reside in one of its agencies (e.g., OCHA, UNHCR, or any other equally credible, neutral, and well-known organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]). As stated earlier, however, participants thought that for the time being, NGOs and IOs should concentrate on improving information sharing within their own organizational cultures. Once there is an information-sharing strategy and mechanisms to support it, then a separate but interoperable information regime should be created to allow organizations to share particular information more broadly on an as-needed basis. The degree of formality as well as the level of interaction may be crisis specific and subject to shifts in organizational mandates.

Given NGOs' independent agendas, varied resources, and different operating systems and capacities, participants suggested that, depending on conditions and adequate financing, NGOs could adopt common platforms and networks that would preserve organizational integrity. Besides expediting relief implementation, such a system would help NGOs and donors to move money away from duplicated efforts or efforts to "reinvent the wheel" and toward disbursement of more goods and services. What is needed, participants agreed, is interoperable technology, headquarters to field and among field organizations and agencies; an intraoperational network; archiving methodology; and backup systems. This set of tools would address the different capacities, resources, and limitations of the organizations represented in the field.

To arrive at this level of communication efficiency, relief organizations would have to agree to a common architecture, common platforms, and common networks as well as data

standards in terms of inputs and outputs. No such open system exists today. Even if the military could provide such a system, the military is rarely present in most humanitarian crises. Therefore, the humanitarian community should develop a robust information-sharing regime among its many agencies. It should be noted that a trend within both the military and the civilian relief entities toward increased use of COTS equipment is afoot, which may help alleviate the technical challenges of interoperable systems.

Communication systems are a key challenge for NGOs in the field both in time spent training staff and money for the equipment and infrastructure -- not to mention the rapid turnover of personnel. Whereas the military trains and retains personnel in order to ensure excellent field communications. It also allocates sufficient resources to upgrade its equipment to overcome most field conditions. Participants discussed using some of military resources to support NGO and IO communications, networks, and security. For example, a lack of radio frequencies is a constraint that often thwarts NGO ability to coordinate and even survive in the field. The military has a certain amount of bandwidth assigned to it for its operations. Participants agreed that if the military could dedicate some bandwidth for NGO and IO use, this could alleviate a critical constraint for them. They could use radio frequencies on an as-needed basis for their operations.

Furthermore, the existence of such a communications system could provide the military with information about the whereabouts and activities of NGOs in the field. However, there should be great caution about suggesting such an arrangement even if there appears to be excess capacity; CA as such has neither the mandate nor the authority to monitor the safety of relief workers. Under present circumstances, it is unlikely that CA or other military units could commit to monitoring NGO activities continuously. Even if feasible, awareness of an emergency does not necessarily mean that the military will "send in the cavalry" on a rescue mission. Local commanders generally need the approval of commanders above them to deploy troops.

On the plus side, however, CA personnel would gain a day-to-day familiarity with civilian activities, enabling better interaction between the civilian and military organizations in the field. Participants thought that CA units, when present, could assign a telecommunications specialist to each CMOC to facilitate communications with NGOs and IOs. This position would be in addition to existing G6/S6 staffing structures that focus on internal military communications. The new function would be to consult and act as a liaison to encourage and support interoperable telecommunications among CA units and NGOs, not to set up or maintain such a system.

CA participants suggested earmarking funds in order to have the flexibility to purchase the communications equipment needed for each situation. Often computer and communications equipment assigned to the military is not compatible with that of NGOs and IOs. By setting aside money to meet such field exigencies, the military could purchase compatible equipment. Furthermore, the military could leave the equipment behind for subsequent military rotations, which would allow for continuity between rotations. It must be noted, however, that this presents a real problem when the overall authority for an operation shifts from one institution to another. Trying to get the U.S. military to leave behind the vehicles used by the Kosovo Diplomatic Observers Mission for use by the incoming Kosovo Verification Mission was reportedly a bureaucratic nightmare of the first order. Another source of funds within the U.S. government, such as OFDA, could be ramped up for these kinds of expenditures. However, these kinds of responses require transcending conventional bureaucratic procedures and developing a highly specific interagency budget fungibility (perhaps built into Presidential Decision Directive 56).

Finally, CA participants observed that these ideas required a standing policy; otherwise, such practices would occur infrequently and only by happenstance. Participants from the civilian and military sectors proposed that each have in place a generic policy specifying that the organizations would cooperate or at least share some information. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between two or more major organizations could shape the implementation of such a policy, reflecting the type and scope of the operation and offering each organization flexibility as it encounters unanticipated contingencies. An MOU, as an extension of the policy, should be in place prior to deployment even if and especially if the civilian and military organizations intend to limit interaction.

Recommendations

Operational organizations in CHEs should

- Improve respective internal information mechanisms and agree to standards that ensure interoperability among implementing organizations.
- Draft organizational policies for cooperation and coordination with military or civilian counterparts, even if it is to mandate against such interaction or to acknowledge that cooperation and coordination is situational.
- Work on developing the main features of an information-sharing regime during CHEs:
 - An information clearinghouse that is publicly available, interoperable, comprehensive, trustworthy, donor supported, and is the principal repository for humanitarian activity information;

- A communications system that is rapidly deployable anywhere, anytime;
- Off-the-shelf architecture, common templates, and standardized protocols;
- Management by neutral entities (e.g., ICRC or a UN lead agency or its implementing partner);
- A system that is sustainable, reliable, and unclassified, and that "does no harm."
- Earmark assets to establish the entire operation's communications capacity. One effort would be the creation of a position for a telecommunications "guru" -- a G6/S6 within the military (but coordinated through the G5 or CMOC) -- who would focus on civilian communications interfaces, issues, and needs. Another effort would be to set aside for NGO use radio frequencies from bandwidth typically allocated to the military during a crisis response.
- Allow the military to use a discretionary budget to purchase equipment needed to communicate with any and all other willing organizations in the field.
- Promote and coordinate as much as is necessary and possible on relief-to-recovery transition initiatives.
- Promote the notion of CMOC- and HCIC-like structures in CHEs within and among planners and implementers.
- Test the combined CMOC/HCIC model in the field.

Scenario: The Next Complex Humanitarian Emergency¹

A humanitarian crisis breaks out in a country, autonomous region, or breakaway state. Among the first entities to the scene is a *neutral actor* (e.g., a UN agency or another IO or NGO) accompanied by a *contracted technical partner* (e.g., Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), Telecoms sans Frontières, or other existing resources) responsible for establishing a web of communications. A shared Internet infrastructure (like IPKO) is developed so that IOs, NGOs, the military, and the local populace will have Internet access. An HCIC is set up in the capital city or another centralized location to serve as an information clearinghouse for new international arrivals as well as to equip them with communication and coordination mechanisms. A series of field HCICs are also set up throughout the AOR. The HCICs serve as venues for person-to-person contacts, individual mailboxes, bulletin boards, and organizational meetings.

The contracted technical partner will ensure that all willing members of the humanitarian community are linked, have discrete and secure levels of communication, and are represented via the HCIC's Internet Web site. Additionally, the technical partner will establish an intranet with levels of security. In other words, the HCIC Web site offers public access; one

intranet level is for intraorganizational communication, say for all CARE staff (one of the largest international nongovernmental relief and development organizations in the world), from headquarters to field, and among CARE members in the field; and the other intranet level is for sectoral organizations, those working in the medical or sanitation sectors. Each intranet level would be secure; only designated organizations, sectors, or individuals could access the proprietary data.²

The capital-area HCIC would maintain the central database of information about the humanitarian activities and would act as a filter, monitoring inputs from all field HCICs to ensure information integrity and discipline. It would not, however, serve as a "command and control" mechanism for the lead agency. Participating NGOs would be committed to information transparency, providing critical information for others to understand missions and activities in the field and contributing to the organizational and sectoral intranet levels, as appropriate. Information self-policing would be expected and maintained, as poor information sources and shoddy work quickly lose credibility and jeopardize lives. Knowledge of relevant relief entities and respective personal contacts is key to the integrity of the information. In other respects the capital HCIC is another field site; all field HCICs will possess the full range of technical capabilities to provide intranet and Internet data to and get data from NGOs in their AOR as part of their decentralized responsibilities. Once an HCIC is in place, the contracted technical partner will send out "circuit riders" as mobile on-call troubleshooters to offer technical assistance to all the HCICs during the humanitarian response.

Equipping and operationalizing an HCIC site to serve as an information and activity hub can be prohibitively costly for a single organization. Accordingly, NGOs might agree to share the expense equally or in terms of its relative value to their field operation. Sharing the costs but acquiring the benefits of standardized and streamlined platforms, information, maps, and other georeferenced material would avoid the frustration and cost of duplicated efforts, not to mention enable access to more and better-quality information than any single organization could pay for. Moreover, in the relief-to-development period at the end of the crisis, putting the equipment and infrastructure in the hands of local citizens to use and manage expedites the transition from crisis to reconstruction.

Participants observed that the best initial proving ground for the information regime described above would be a natural disaster. A CHE involves a variety of political mandates that complicate information sharing between the military and civilians.

If the Military Arrives

In this scenario, military entities will have made contact with civilian humanitarian groups already present in the field and be familiar with the existing situation and structures. Much of this deployment information they will have accessed through the HCIC Web site and cross-training exercises and contacts with military liaison staff of various IOs and NGOs.

As part of the advanced CMOC deployment, a CA contingent appoints a person to serve as liaison with the HCIC site upon arrival. CA will be an integral part of the CMOC, which the military sets up to organize its activities with the civilian organizations already in the field or en route to the AOR. CA will arrive with a flexible communications budget that can support, augment, and improve upon the existing civilian communications systems. Support to the NGOs and IOs might include allocating radio equipment and frequencies, monitoring those frequencies, linking up with the HCIC virtually, uploading declassified military information for civilian use, and accessing civilian information for use by the military command.³

Conclusions

Two of the most valuable axioms expressed during this conference were "Plan we must versus plan if we can" and regarding coordination, "Not always; get over it" They aptly characterize the cultural differences that have caused misunderstanding, distrust, and disregard between the civilian humanitarian groups and their military counterparts in planning and implementing responses to a CHE. Once explicitly formulated, these axioms made clear for the first time that these groups are not willfully uncooperative, but culturally different. Each group came to understand this difference in a way that would allow the group to work harmoniously with the other, because it was also clear that the nature of these organizations and their core practices would not soon change. The two declarations became a kind of treaty of coexistence. Now, the hardest work remained; managing the groups' coexistence during a CHE.

The second valuable contribution this conference made to the problems associated with coordinating CHEs was to reframe the civilian-military relationship and to offer a model of how that relationship could work on the ground. For all those participants at the conference, Guineastan will hereafter represent the optimum civilian-military collaboration. In the act of creating the Guineastan model, CA, NGO, and IO participants recognized that through cooperation rather than integration and coordination, each entity was free to perform at its best, with the complementary support and understanding of the other, but without the overriding worry of compromising operational security. Participants realized that they need not share the same

hardware and software architecture to be linked as a civilian-military network. They proposed the HCIC, the linchpin for the Guineastan model, as the information hub that will link the military's CMOC with humanitarian network into a CHE operational network.

The HCIC model, however, will serve these objectives if and only if the four following general principles are vigilantly observed. These principles are the result of the lessons learned by the participants from their combined experience and the deliberative discussions that occurred during the workshop.

1. Principles of conduct do not necessarily hinder cooperation between military and humanitarian entities during CHEs. An understanding of such principles, however, is a requirement for effective cooperation in advanced planning and implementation in the field.
2. If each entity is familiar with the nature and operations of the other entities and a person functions as liaison, information exchange in predeployment can be facilitated and a degree of cooperation in the implementation phase of humanitarian relief efforts can be ensured.
3. During the implementation phase, NGO and IO coordination, on the one hand, and the establishment of CMOCs with CA presence, on the other, create the necessary conditions for an information-sharing regime.
4. Such an information-sharing regime relies on a neutral information clearinghouse for humanitarian activities, which in turn is based on a commitment to information transparency and respect for principles of conduct.

Endnotes

1. Assumptions are made about a range of critical issues, from communications infrastructure and policies in a particular host country, which the Tampere Convention will either cover or not, to knowledge about COTS equipment used by the military and the civilian entities.

2. Organizational and sectoral intraconnectivity (organizational refers to the broad range of IOs and NGOs; sectoral is that which is service specific [e.g., health sector]).

3. There already is a very sophisticated project for creating a "virtual command" center based on 56k wireless "packet" technology and "wireless application protocols." It is being conducted in the Vancouver, BC, area under the lead of Simon Fraser University. Among the project's premises are that the players will have incompatible communications equipment and that the local telecommunications infrastructure will have been

disrupted to a great extent by the disaster.

Appendices

Appendix 1: The Realities of Coordination/Cooperation: Debunking as a Survival Tool

By H. Roy Williams, Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, U.S. Agency for International Development

One of the unfortunate realities of our time is that the number of disasters, both human-made and natural, has increased. Disasters are not only increasing in frequency but involving more people and coming more quickly than our planning and responses allow for. Indications suggest that this is going to be the way of the future. In 1998 there were more recorded disasters than in any previous year in human history. In early 1999, there was a falling off, but by the end of 1999, we began to see an increase in the number of disasters that continues today.

Another reality caused by a combination of political necessity and public relations is that the military will be involved in more of these disasters, whether it wants to or not. Not always or even usually for predictable reasons, but because much of what we do is controlled by perceptions-what "seems" to be the case-decisions to intervene militarily will be made on the basis of perceptions. And we must accept those decisions.

Often the military will be introduced into a situation later than it should; or before it should; or even over the objections of the humanitarian agencies. For instance, the discussion that occurred when NATO moved into Macedonia was about what the United Nations' relationship would be with NATO. The conversation reflected the reality that the NATO militaries felt they had to be seen in Macedonia. That was the beginning and end of the story, regardless of how it might otherwise have been interpreted or irrespective of the UN feeling that their humanitarian role was being usurped by the military.

What happened in Macedonia between the military and civilian sectors was inevitable. I grew up in New York, and one of the few things that New Yorkers pride themselves on is being streetwise. We are not sentimental about what we see occurring in front of us. We figure, "Okay, this is the way things are, and I'm just going to find a way to get around it, take advantage of it, or whatever." In humanitarian work, it is also a good policy to suffer no illusions about how things work. If organizations are committed to assisting people, they must not plan according to hard predictables -- this is going to happen because that is going to happen-but make the best of each circumstance.

From the beginning, however, we need to examine the assumptions that each group has about the other. If the military arrives with a lot of resources, all wearing the same uniform, it will create an impression, people from humanitarian organizations will feel both envy and suspicion. It's a human response. On the other side, if humanitarian relief representatives give the military representatives opaque looks whenever they communicate, the military representatives will doubtless infer that "all these people want is what they can get out of me."

My first exposure to the military in CHEs was in northern Iraq, when there was still very little doctrine governing military operations other than war or CHEs. The military provided a humanitarian space; and we, the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), flowed into that space and did our job. That made it easy. But it is not always that simple. Since then, I have been exposed to a lot of militaries around the world. The NGO community, for its part, assumes that there is one military community, just as the military believes there is a single NGO community. Yet the U.S. Army has many elements. Those elements do not necessarily have the same objectives and convictions. I remember, for example, that in Bosnia one unit had a more proactive approach to dealing with the humanitarian situation. Some units were more pragmatic than other units because doctrine was evolving. That evolution has been very positive.

What about NGOs? Most people who join the NGO community stay three months, six months, or a year. They are goal-oriented people with a lot of motivation. They feel a strong moral imperative and are single-minded. These characteristics do not always lend themselves to planning. Having spent almost twenty years in the NGO community, my own feeling is that NGOs do not plan. The reasons they do not plan, however, are legitimate. An NGO is focusing upon a particular situation, which is circumscribed by the NGOs resources and access and what the donors will pay for the NGO to do. NGOs focus upon immediate responses to the immediate humanitarian crises in front of them. This is not to say that NGOs do not do some long-term planning, but the reality, from the NGO perspective, is that if the NGO is in Bosnia or Rwanda, it is there for a definite objective for a limited amount of time. Thus, to the extent that NGOs focus on present realities-their primary objectives-NGOs do not plan future strategies.

There is a lot of turnover within the civilian and military structures. NGOs turn over the most. But the military also turns over. During Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) invested a great deal of money in mitigation training in Central America. Then many of the trained personnel turned around and left. The OFDA did not

think to institutionalize the training so that the program did not depend upon the trained individuals staying with OFDA. There needed to be a means to pass on the knowledge. To that end, OFDA supports initiatives like the SPHERE project (Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response; www.sphereproject.org) and has prepared its own set of the guidelines so that policymakers, practitioners, the military, and relief workers have a background against which they can make decisions. The guide will help describe what the NGOs expect of themselves, their humanitarian objectives on the ground, and their rationale for those objectives. The guide will help make NGO behavior transparent and predictable to others who work with NGOs during crises. OFDA has taken the guidelines both around the country and around the world. OFDA staff members are now in Kenya training humanitarian organizations to use the guidelines. OFDA plans to do the same for the military, to the extent that it can.

One of the luxuries I have experienced moving from the NGO community into the government is a sudden increase in resources. OFDA must utilize those resources in the most creative way possible. Let me be specific. OFDA has a military liaison unit, whose role in the past has primarily been to work with the military and to do some outreach and education to the NGO community about the military's role. Today, via that liaison OFDA, is planning to do more aggressive outreach. OFDA plans to permanently station a staff member in the U.S. military's Southern and European commands. The purpose is simple. If you cannot depend on people coming to you, you go to them. You align your assumptions about the military's thinking and objectives, facilitate communication, and, to the extent possible, begin to discuss plans before the event.

The military plans and humanitarian organizations plan. OFDA is hoping to make each group aware of the other's planning efforts. Through OFDA's funding support and the support of others like the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and Britain's Department for International Development (DFID), OFDA is in the information and communication flow. From that position, OFDA would like to improve how the planning activities of the various communities are coordinated.

A few years ago, when I was with the International Rescue Committee, I had an idea. For want of a better term, I call it a fusion concept. There's been some reference to it here at this conference. The idea is that to address most effectively any particular humanitarian situation, what is needed is a neutral venue where everybody can come before a crisis erupts and share ideas and begin the process of planning. The objective would be to establish modalities through which agencies of whatever stripe could begin to work together.

But there is no neutral venue, and communication is imperfect.

What can be done? There are humanitarian situations that are increasingly catastrophic. There are resources that are increasingly sophisticated and should be applied to these humanitarian situations. Nevertheless, the timing is not always about choice-sometimes the NGO and military communities both show up at the wrong time, too soon, or too late to support each other. What is needed is a sort of a "virtual" venue where concurrent and simultaneous planning can take place by all the entities when they want to know about, link up, or "fuse" their operations. This mechanism facilitates intercommunity planning by opening up the doors for communication and information exchange.

Conferences like this one are useful because they show our progress in overcoming assumptions and learning how to work together. From the chaotic situation of the UN, its protection force in Bosnia, UNPROFOR, to what we increasingly see with the Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) in Kosovo, East Timor, and Mozambique, we have made progress. Someone observed that CMOCs could be under a tent. That is exactly right. The CMOC is not a structure but a relationship. The CMOC in Berra, Mozambique, was part of an airport hangar. The person running the CMOC understood exactly what needed to be done and set up a situation to facilitate what was already happening on the ground. The World Food Programme had lead relief responsibility. The UN Office of Disaster, Assessment, and Coordination had responsibility for logistics. The CMOC slotted itself in. The effort was very impressive and, I submit, could not have happened five or six years ago. The military and the humanitarian agencies recognized each other's assets and limitations, as well as where each other's responsibilities began and ended.

Today we can safely and constructively say that although coordination does not always exist, cooperation exists. Cooperation occurs when people have common objectives and recognize that those common objectives are really supported by working together. Certainly, coordination can take place within circumscribed areas, say, within a particular situation on the ground there will be a shelter group and a water and sanitation group. These groups will coordinate very effectively on the ground because the reality of the situation will force that coordination.

With that in mind, I applaud the choice of "cooperation" instead of "coordination" in the title of this conference. This word choice wisely avoids creating impossible expectations about how things work in the real world today. Clearly we are all trying to do the best we can to foster cooperation, to communicate with each other, and to begin with a common point of departure to achieve a set of objectives that will help free people from suffering.

Appendix 2: Glossary

Accountability

Being answerable for decisions made and actions in the course of executing one's responsibility during a response.

Activity

A specific set of related actions taken to implement a strategic plan.

Area of Responsibility (AOR)

The U.S. military divides the world into five geographic areas of responsibilities, which are each supervised by area commanders in chief (CINCs). These five commands are the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) for the Latin America land area and the Caribbean, headquartered in Miami, Florida; the Pacific Command (PACOM) for the Pacific Ocean, part of Indian Ocean, and East and Southeast Asia, based in Honolulu, Hawaii; the Central Command (CENTCOM), located in Tampa, Florida, and responsible for countries bordering the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; the European Command (EUCOM) for Europe, parts of Africa not included in CENTCOM, the Mediterranean Sea, and bordering countries, based in Stuttgart, Germany; and USACOM or the Atlantic Command based in Norfolk, Virginia, for the Atlantic Ocean excluding the Caribbean. CINCs have authority to plan and conduct operations in their respective AOR.

Civil Affairs

Activities aimed at establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relations between military forces and civilian authorities, governmental and nongovernmental entities, and civilian populations in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives.

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Resources and arrangements supporting the relationship between NATO and the national authorities, civilian and military; nongovernmental and international organizations; and civilian populations in an area where NATO military forces are or plan to be employed.

Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

Resources and arrangements supporting the relationship between the Joint Task Force commander and the national

authorities, civilian and military; nongovernmental and international organizations; and civilian populations in an area where the U.S. military is or plans to be employed.

Collaboration

Joint effort by two or more organizations in accomplishing an activity.

Complex Humanitarian Emergency (CHE)

Human-made crises and natural disasters requiring an international response and extending beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency.

Contingency planning

The process of setting goals and objectives, devising courses of action and allocating resources necessary for possible future situations that may occur.

Cooperation

Joint action of two or more organizations.

Coordination

Harmonious adjustment of the separate actions of two or more organizations.

Humanitarian assistance

All forms of aid given to people in distress, regardless of political origin, race, religion, or national origin-victims of both natural and human-made disasters.

Humanitarian organizations

International organizations (IOs) or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in providing humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian relief

Activities in the aftermath of natural or human-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property.

Information transparency

The ability of an organization to understand the nature and activities of another organization by viewing (without altering or capturing) pertinent information, excluding information that

compromises the clientele, staff, or integrity of the agency.

Integration

Bringing together different organizations into one unified activity.

International organizations (IOs)

Intergovernmental, or nongovernmental organizations with broad recognition and endorsement from governments and other sectors, and established for the purpose of regulating aspects of international behavior.

Internet

A global network connecting computers and computer networks and based on a common addressing system and communications protocol called TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol).

Interoperability

The ability of two or more organizations to interact and exchange information according to agreed-upon methods in the pursuit of their goals and objectives. Such ability depends on the use of computer and telecommunications standards and protocols as well as knowledge of each organization's principles of conduct, roles, goals, objectives, procedures, and terminology.

Intranet

An internal network of computers and local networks based on Internet protocols, allowing an organization to utilize the same user-friendly software deployed on the Internet.

Joint Task Force (JTF)

A group established by an area commander in chief for the field management of large military activities when a mission involves two or more military services on a significant scale and requires the close integration of military efforts to meet specific military objectives.

Lead agency

An organization that as a result of its expertise and capability has been mandated by the international community to initiate the coordination of the activities of civilian agencies that participate in a CHE. The lead agency is normally a major UN agency such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). There are three functions of the lead agency: act as a point of contact for other civilian agencies,

coordinate field activities to avoid duplication of effort and wasting of resources, and act as a liaison with the military.

Military

Members, units, services, and assets of the armed forces of the United States, charged with the preservation of peace and security and the defense of the nation.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

Military activities during peacetime or conflict that do not necessarily involve armed confrontation between opposing organized forces.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

Private nonprofit organizations that are not accountable to governments or profit-making enterprises. These organizations may, however, work with governments and serve as channels for government assistance to communities in need.

Peace operations

An umbrella term that encompasses activities predominantly diplomatic or civilian in character (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacebuilding) and complementary activities that are predominantly military (peacekeeping and peace enforcement).

Response

Actions carried out in the face of an adverse event and aimed at saving lives, alleviating suffering, and reducing economic losses.

S/G/J6

Special, general, or joint command staff designation under the commander of a Joint Task Force (JTF) charged with providing all telecommunications needs for the JTF. The other designations under the JTF commander are (S/G/J1-S/G/J5): administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, and plans and policies.

Strategic planning

The process of setting goals and objectives, devising courses of action, and allocating resources for an organization.

Appendix 3: Summary of Recommendations

Specific recommendations from the planning and implementation workshops follow:

- Operational organizations in CHEs should
- Avoid compromising civilian organizational integrity or neutrality by promoting and supporting better information transparency from everyone.
- Increase information exchange among and between civilian and military organizations in order to reduce operational security risks and to avoid duplication of efforts.
- Have the U.S. government review classification criteria with an eye toward loosening them and quickly declassifying information useful for the civilian counterparts in the field.
- Educate donors about the risks of disregarding emerging local needs, conditions, and initiatives.
- Develop policy statements that define the mechanisms and tools by which civilian and military organizations can interact before, during and after CHEs.
- Heighten awareness about successes and failures in the transition from relief to reconstruction. Consider transition initiatives for reconstruction early in the crisis planning.
- Encourage familiarity with other organizations' cultures, methodologies, and missions through cross-training.
- Establish formal or informal training exchanges between and prior to deployments.
- Explore the possibility of having consultative exchanges or permanent liaisons between organizations.
- Make up-to-date information about each organization's activities, plans, and resources easily available before, during, and after the crisis.
- Provide more discretionary spending for the military in the field to offset the inconvenience and frustration of having less capacity to respond to unexpected conditions, a kind of "contingency capacity."
- Provide military units in the field with COTS hardware and software to support internetworking with the entire range of participants in CHEs.
- Develop and adhere to a policy governing information sharing in the field.
- Agree to, establish, and comply with generic assessment language and standard data sets to prepare, share, and evaluate accurate and uniform assessments.
- Agree to, establish, and comply with common measures of performance to evaluate relief responses.
- Centrally locate all field assessments, so they can be reviewed, updated, and evaluated to minimize duplication of effort and to maximize effectiveness of all field actors. Putting data on a dedicated Web site or

otherwise establishing a well-known and easily accessible information clearinghouse would serve a number of uses and users: (1) providing tools for planners and predeployment actors; (2) offering a ready, transparent, and centralized database for mission implementers; (3) reducing duplication of efforts in the field; and (4) accelerating postcrisis reconstruction.

- Strengthen ReliefWeb.
- Consider the Kosovo HCIC model for NGO and IO coordination efforts in CHEs.
- Consider the IPKO model as a shared transferable Internet infrastructure.
- Improve respective internal information mechanisms and agree to standards that ensure interoperability among implementing organizations.
- Draft organizational policies for cooperation and coordination with military or civilian counterparts, even if it is to mandate against such interaction, or to acknowledge that cooperation and coordination is situational.
- Work on developing the main features of an information-sharing regime during CHEs:
 - An information clearinghouse that is publicly available, interoperable, comprehensive, trustworthy, and donor supported and is the principal repository for humanitarian activity information;
 - A communications system that is rapidly deployable anywhere, anytime;
 - Off-the-shelf architecture, common templates, and standardized protocols;
 - Management by neutral actors (e.g., ICRC or a UN lead agency or its implementing partner);
 - A system that is sustainable, reliable, and unclassified, and that "does no harm."
- Earmark assets to establish the entire operation's communications capacity. One effort would be the creation of a position for a telecommunications "guru" -- a G6/S6 within the military (but coordinated through the G5 or CMOC) -- who would focus on civilian communications interfaces, issues, and needs. Another effort would be to set aside for NGO use radio frequencies from bandwidth typically allocated to the military during a crisis response.
- Allow the military to use a discretionary budget to purchase equipment needed to communicate with any and all other willing organizations in the field.
- Promote and coordinate as much as is necessary and possible on relief-to-recovery transition initiatives.
- Promote the notion of CMOC- and HCIC-like structures in CHEs within and among planners and implementers.
- Test the combined CMOC/HCIC model in the field.

Appendix 4: Acronyms Used in This Document

AOR	Area of Responsibility
CA	Civil Affairs (US Military)
CHE	Complex Humanitarian Emergency
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation (NATO)
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center (US Military)
COTS	Commercial Off-the-Shelf
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
GIST	Geographic Information Support Team
HCIC	Humanitarian Community Information Center
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IPKO	Internet Project Kosovo
IO	International Organization
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISP	Internet Service Provider
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OSCE	Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHARE	Structured Humanitarian Assistance Reporting; GIST Report
SPHERE	Humanitarian Charter & Minimum Standards in Disaster
TCIP/IP	Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Commission in Kosovo
VITA	Volunteers in Technical Assistance

Appendix 5: Organizational Descriptors of Event Participants

ADDITIONAL U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS PARTICIPANTS

96th CA Battalion, Fort Bragg, NC

304th CA Brigade, Philadelphia, PA

308th CA Brigade, Homewood, IL

321st CA Brigade, San Antonio, TX

351st CA Command, Mountain View, CA

404th CA Battalion, Fort Dix, NJ

411th CA Battalion, Danbury, CT and Belton, MO

415th CA Battalion, Kalamazoo & Portage, MI

418th CA Battalion, Belton, MO

432nd CA Battalion, Green Bay, WI

443rd CA Battalion, Warwick, RI

490th CA Battalion, Abilene, TX

U.S. Civil Affairs Psychological Operations Command, Ft. Bragg, NC

ADDITIONAL U.S. ARMED FORCES PARTICIPANTS

Electrical Systems Center, International Operations, Hanscomb AFB, MA

Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego, CA

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Air & Space Operations, Pentagon, Washington DC

U.S. Army Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL

U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting, Suffolk, VA

OTHER MILITARY PARTICIPANTS

British Army Civil Affairs Group, Gibraltar Barracks, Surrey, UK

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington, DC

Naval Postgraduate School, Department of Systems Management, Monterey, CA

Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Medford,

MA

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (IOS) AND RELIEF AGENCIES

Action Against Hunger (AAH) - a non-profit NGO that intervenes in crisis situations to bring assistance to victims of war and famine, regardless their race, creed or political affiliation and to restore their capacity to sustain themselves as soon as possible.

ActionAid Africa (AAA), Emergency Support Center for Africa (ESCA) - AAA ESCA is charged with providing strategic emergencies support to 13 sub-Saharan country programs and several cross-border initiatives. This unit not only provides operational program support as a secondary service but is also engaged in research, advocacy and policy work.

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) - a Quaker organization that includes people of various faiths who are committed to social justice, peace, and humanitarian service. Its work is based on the Religious Society of Friends (Quaker) belief in the worth of every person, and faith in the power of love to overcome violence and injustice.

CARE International - one of the world's largest private international relief and development organizations. CARE's experience, worldwide reach and efficiency offer concrete and lasting solutions to the complex problem of poverty.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) - founded in 1943 by the Catholic Bishops of the United States to alleviate human suffering, engage people in their own development, foster charity and justice in the world, work to remove causes of poverty and promote social justice.

Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs (CDMHA) - a partnership between Tulane University and the University of South Florida designed to facilitate collaborative education, training, research and information services between disaster response and humanitarian agencies primarily throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Delegation of the European Commission, European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) - one of the largest aid organizations in the world, with an annual budget of some 450 million euro. Its European Union (EU) funded programs provide emergency and humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced people, and are implemented through partnerships with NGOs, UN agencies and other international bodies such as the Red Cross. ECHO has concluded 'Framework Partnerships' with 150 European NGOs and a

number of operational contracts with American aid organizations.

Feed the Children International (FTCI) - an international, non-profit, Christian development organization committed to assisting poor children and families worldwide by providing food, education, economic development, and relief assistance to alleviate suffering.

Food for the Hungry International (FHI) - an international relief and development agency of Christian motivation that operates programs in more than 25 countries worldwide, in activity which includes agriculture, health and sanitation.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

International Crisis Group (ICG) - is a private, multinational organization committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict. ICG currently operates field projects in nine crisis-affected countries worldwide.

International Medical Corps (IMC) - a Los Angeles-based humanitarian relief organization dedicated to saving lives and relieving suffering through the delivery of health care training and medical relief programs in areas worldwide where few organizations serve.

Internet Project Kosovo (IPKO) - an independent non-profit organization based in Pristina, Kosova dedicated to providing the tools, knowledge, and environment required for Kosova to participate in the global information society. Begun as a project of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), IPKO is the leading Internet Service Provider in Kosova, providing fixed-wireless Internet service to more than 80 organizations, including all the UN agencies, OSCE, and most large NGOs. IPKO sells service to international organizations and for-profit companies and provides free connections to key civil society entities like the university, hospital, local media, and local NGOs.

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Mercy Corps International (MCI) - a humanitarian assistance agency that alleviates suffering by helping people build secure, productive and just communities in countries afflicted by disaster or in social, political or economic transition.

Mercy International-USA - based in Plymouth, Michigan, Mercy International-USA is dedicated to helping people help themselves, through relief and disaster response projects in health care, food, agriculture, reconstruction and other refugee assistance.

United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - established pursuant to the adoption of the Secretary-General's program for reform and in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 46/182, OCHA Emergency Relief Coordinators focus on policy development and coordination functions in support of the Secretary-General, ensuring that all humanitarian issues, including those which fall between gaps in existing mandates of agencies such as protection and assistance for internally displaced persons, are addressed; advocacy of humanitarian issues with political organs, notably the Security Council; and coordination of humanitarian emergency response, by ensuring that an appropriate response mechanism is established through Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) consultations, on the ground.

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) - a private, nonprofit, international organization that defines its mission as empowering the poor in Asia, Africa and Latin America to manage their own development through technical and project assistance.

World Vision International - an international Christian relief and development organization working to promote the well being of all people -- especially that of children in approximately 90 countries of the world.

OTHER STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

Cooperative Research Program (CCRP) - a component of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD C3I), performs an important role in bringing an informed understanding of important issues to the attention of the Department of Defense and international C4ISR (includes Computers, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) community. Focused research is conducted on C4ISR issues of interest and the results are disseminated through CCRP-led activities and publications.

Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) - a federally funded research center that works for the U.S. Department of Defense.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) - helps local partners advance peace and democracy in priority conflict-prone countries. Seizing critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key transition needs.

U.S. State Department, Bureau of Population, Refugees & Migration

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping (PM/CP)

Office of International Organizations/Policy, Public and Congressional Affairs (IO/PPC)

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